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A “sentence of death” had been passed on John H. Tunstall “long 
before he was killed” on February 18, 1878, according to Tunstall’s friend 
and business partner Alexander McSween.1 Tunstall, an Englishman, had 
prospered as a rancher and merchant in Lincoln County, New Mexico. 
Those with entrenched economic and political power, who had allies in the 
judiciary and in law enforcement, resented his success. When a local judge 
issued a writ of attachment against Tunstall’s store and livestock, Sheriff 
William Brady raised a posse to serve the writ.2 Sensing trouble, Tunstall 
fled, taking his horses with him. He had hired a young gunman for 
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protection, but it was not enough. The posse gave chase for thirty miles, 
ultimately killing Tunstall with shots to the head and breast.3 After 
witnessing Tunstall’s murder, the young gunman, known to some as Billy 
the Kid, joined McSween and others to form “The Regulators.” The 
Lincoln County War had begun. 
* 
Juán Franco, a U.S. citizen and deputy constable, held a well-known 
grudge against Francisco Mallén, the Mexican Consul in El Paso, Texas. 
After Franco accosted Mallén on the street and slapped him, Franco 
published a statement in the El Paso Daily Times alleging that Mallén had 
purposefully thwarted the extradition of a Mexican suspect in the murder of 
Franco’s brother-in-law to the United States.4 The feud did not end there. 
Less than two months later, on October 13, 1907, the two men found 
themselves travelling in the same street car from Ciudad Juárez to El Paso. 
Franco spied a pistol in Mallén’s pocket, which Mallén claimed the El Paso 
county attorney had advised him to carry for his own protection.5 
According to Mallén, Franco approached him from the rear and struck a 
“vicious blow” to his right temple, driving the left side of his head into a 
window frame and rendering him unconscious. Franco then dragged 
Mallén at gunpoint “with [his] clothes disarranged and [his] face bathed in 
blood, through the streets of El Paso to the County Jail.”6 Franco was 
convicted on charges of aggravated assault and battery and ordered to pay a 
$100 fine.7 Mallén was recalled to Mexico and never fully recovered from 
his injuries. 
INTRODUCTION 
The historical roots of the modern law of state responsibility lie in 
principles developed to adjust compensation claims brought by states on 
behalf of their injured nationals. The infamous assaults on John Tunstall 
and Francisco Mallén gave rise to claims for reparations against the United 
States because the assailants allegedly acted under color of state law. Since 
the injured parties were foreigners, the question was whether the United 
States had breached a duty owed to another state’s national. In each case, 
answering that question required determining whether the assailant’s 
actions were attributable to the United States. 
 
 3.  Local Remedies, Tunstall’s Case, 6 MOORE’S DIGEST, ch. 21, §987, at 662 [hereinafter 
Tunstall’s Case]. 
 4.  FRANCISCO MALLÉN, THREATS ON THE LIFE OF CONSUL MALLÉN 2 (1909). 
 5.  Id. at 4. 
 6.  Id. at 5. 
 7.  Id. at 6. 
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During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, jurists 
developed principles of attribution in the context of the international law of 
state responsibility. More recently, these principles have figured 
prominently in debates about the scope of foreign official immunity. Under 
customary international law, and under the 1976 U.S. Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA), foreign states and their agencies and 
instrumentalities are generally immune from the jurisdiction of other 
countries’ domestic courts for their public acts (acts jure imperii).8 Unlike 
some other countries’ state immunity acts, the FSIA does not govern the 
jurisdictional immunities of current or former foreign officials; these are 
left to other statutes and to the common law.9 
The starting-point for most conceptual and doctrinal discussions of 
foreign official immunity is the observation that states can act only through 
individuals.10 That does not, however, mean individuals invariably enjoy 
the same immunity accorded foreign states. Instead, individual officials are 
capable of performing three types of acts and the immunity afforded each 
varies: 
 
1) Acts attributable solely to the state and for which such attribution 
discharges the individual from personal responsibility, such as 
signing a treaty or entering into a commercial transaction on behalf 
of the state (“Category One”). 
2) Acts attributable to the state and for which such attribution does not 
discharge the individual from personal responsibility under 
domestic and/or international law, such as ordering torture 
(“Category Two”).11 
 
 8.  See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 
I.C.J. Rep 99, ¶ 70 (Feb. 3); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993). 
 9.  Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 319 (2010); see also Chimène I. Keitner, Foreign Official 
Immunity After Samantar, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 837, 843 (2011). 
 10.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual 
Officials, and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 9, 10 (2009). 
 11.  Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture defines “torture” as including certain prohibited 
acts “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85.  Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2012) defines “torture” to mean “an act committed by a person acting 
under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other 
than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical 
control.” 
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3) Acts not attributable to the state and for which the individual bears 
sole responsibility, such as vandalizing a neighbor’s property 
without actual or apparent state authority (“Category Three”). 
 
When Deputy Constable Juán Franco walked up to Francisco Mallén 
on the street in El Paso and slapped him Franco performed a Category 
Three act because the slap did not involve any use of actual or apparent 
state authority. By contrast, Franco performed the second attack with 
apparent (if not actual) state authority, since he purported to arrest Mallén 
and dragged him off to jail. An international arbitral tribunal ultimately 
determined that the second attack fell into Category Two, as discussed in 
Part I below.12 
Imagine Mallén’s consternation if he learned that, one hundred years 
later, an English court would cite his case for the proposition that an 
official like Franco is entitled to immunity from civil claims brought 
against him in another country’s court because the injurious act is 
attributable to a foreign state. Yet, that is precisely what the U.K. House of 
Lords held in dismissing civil claims for torture brought by a U.K. citizen 
against a Saudi Arabian official.13 Other domestic courts have adopted 
similar reasoning in dismissing claims for torture and other abuses of state 
authority brought against foreign officials, even where the claimant sought 
recourse solely against the official and not the foreign state itself.14 
The decision to attribute Franco’s second assault to the United States 
was not inevitable. The arbitral tribunal could, instead, have found that the 
attack was not attributable to the state because it was ultra vires, or beyond 
the scope of Mallén’s legitimate authority. Indeed, that is the position the 
United States adopted in the Tunstall case. When the United Kingdom 
sought indemnity on behalf of John Tunstall’s father for the abuse of 
official authority that led to his son’s death,15 the United States responded 
 
 12.  See Mallén (Mex.) v. United States, 4 R.I.A.A. 173 (Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1927). 
 13.  Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26 [75], [2007] 1 AC (HL) 270 (Lord Hoffmann LJ) 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (citing Mallén, 4 R.I.A.A. at 174). 
 14.  See generally Chimène I. Keitner, Foreign Official Immunity and the “Baseline” Problem, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 605 (2011) (citing a number of such cases).  For critiques of expansive approaches to 
foreign official immunity more generally, see, for example, Beth Stephens, Abusing the Authority of the 
State: Denying Foreign Official Immunity for Egregious Human Rights Abuses, 44 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1163 (2011); Lorna McGregor, Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, 
Distorting Sovereignty, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 903 (2008). 
 15.  Letter from Thomas F. Bayard to Lionel S. Sackville-West (June 1, 1885), in PAPERS 
RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES [1885] 450–51 (1886) (citing Sir 
Edward Thornton’s notes of March 9, 1878, and June 23, 1880) [hereinafter Letter from Secretary of 
State Bayard]. 
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that the shooting was not attributable to the United States because it fell 
outside the scope of the officials’ agency.16 In other words, the United 
States would have placed the actions of Sheriff Brady and his posse in 
Category Three, not Category Two. 
Tunstall, Mallén, and similar cases illustrate that state practice on 
whether to attribute ultra vires acts to the state for purposes of state 
responsibility was divided in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  Faced with these divided views, which are explored further in 
Part I, the International Law Commission (ILC) ultimately chose to adopt a 
broad attribution rule in order to promote clarity and facilitate recovery. 
The ILC did not consider the potential implications for the doctrine of 
foreign official immunity of attributing an official’s ultra vires act to the 
state. It did, however, specify that its articles on state responsibility are 
without prejudice to questions of individual responsibility.17 
Part I of this Article sheds new light on inconsistent state practice 
regarding whether state officials’ acts fall into Category Two (under a 
broad approach to attribution) or into Category Three (under a narrow 
approach to attribution). Part II explores the unintended consequences of 
the ILC’s decision to codify a broad attribution rule in the Draft Articles on 
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility) for the doctrine of foreign official 
immunity, bringing the core pieces of what might be called the “attribution 
puzzle” into sharper focus. Understanding the origins and implications of 
the ILC’s broad approach to attribution in the context of the law of state 
responsibility helps us move beyond an oversimplified reliance on 
attribution as the sole criterion for delineating the scope of foreign official 
immunity in two ways. First, it encourages decision-makers to differentiate 
explicitly between acts that fall into Category One, in which attribution to 
the state discharges the individual from personal responsibility, and those 
that fall into Category Two, in which attribution to the state does not 
discharge the individual from personal responsibility. Second, it 
emphasizes that the trade-offs involved in developing principles of 
responsibility and immunity for states may overlap with, but are not 
identical to, the trade-offs involved in developing principles of 
responsibility and immunity for individuals. 
 
 16.  Id. at 450. 
 17.  Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
No. 10, at 363, art. 58, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, U.N. 
Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 2001 ILC Draft Articles]. 
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I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
A. Categorizing Acts by State Officials 
Because states can act only through individuals, domestic courts have 
often viewed the question of foreign official immunity through the lens of 
state responsibility. This approach, however, can be misleading. Recall the 
three categories of acts proposed in the Introduction: 
 
Category Is the Act 
Attributable 
to the State? 
Does 
Attribution to 
the State 
Discharge the 
Officials from 
Personal 
Responsibility? 
Responsibility 
Borne by: 
Examples: 
One Yes Yes State Only Signing a 
Treaty or 
Entering into a 
Commercial 
Transaction on 
Behalf of the 
State 
Two Yes No State and 
Individual 
Ordering 
Torture 
Three No N/A Individual 
Only 
Vandalizing a 
Neighbor’s 
Property 
Without 
Actual or 
Apparent State 
Authority 
 
Since individuals do not bear personal responsibility for Category One 
acts, it makes sense to shield foreign officials from the legal consequences 
of those acts.18 Entering into a commercial transaction on behalf of a state, 
 
 18.  In Propend Finance Property Ltd. v. Sing, for example, the court dismissed a claim against 
the incumbent Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police Force for an improper fax sent by an 
Australian diplomat because the incumbent Commissioner bore no personal responsibility for the act, 
which was performed before he took office. The challenged act could not be imputed to the named 
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for instance, is a Category One act for which an individual official 
generally does not incur personal liability. Accordingly, as Lady Hazel Fox 
has suggested, the appropriate defense to foreign legal proceedings brought 
against an individual for entering into a commercial transaction on behalf 
of a state is the absence of personal responsibility rather than the presence 
of an applicable immunity.19 
Courts have not always drawn a uniform line between Category One 
and Category Two acts; for example, some have treated officials as 
potentially personally liable for purchases made on behalf of a state.20 
Nevertheless, the distinction between Category One and Category Two acts 
has generated less debate and discussion than the line between Category 
Two and Category Three acts. 
Both Category Two and Category Three acts indisputably involve the 
personal responsibility of the individual actor. However, there is no basis 
for a foreign official to claim ratione materiae immunity for a Category 
Three act because there is no relevant link to the state other than the 
incidental identity of the alleged wrongdoer. To be sure, an incumbent 
diplomat, head of state or head of government, foreign minister, or member 
of a special diplomatic mission could invoke status-based (ratione 
personae) immunity from foreign legal proceedings absent a waiver of 
immunity by her state, but such immunity would not persist beyond her 
term in office.21 Unlike status-based immunity, a claim of conduct-based or 
ratione materiae immunity derives from the official nature of the alleged 
conduct, not the official position of the defendant at the time of the legal 
 
official. [1997] EWCA (Civ) 1433 (UK). Likewise, the ICTY held that it could not issue a subpoena to 
a foreign official since the State, not the official, was the target of the subpoena, and the ICTY lacked 
the power to sanction the State itself for non-compliance. Responsibility for complying with the 
subpoena lay solely with the State, not the official. Prosecutor v. Blaskič, Case No. IT-95-14-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997). 
 19.  See Hazel Fox, Imputability and Immunity as Separate Concepts: The Removal of Immunity 
From Civil Proceedings Relating to the Commission of an International Crime, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND POWER: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL ORDER AND JUSTICE 165, 172–73 (Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad 
& Michael Bohlander eds., 2009). 
 20.  For an early case finding that a foreign official lacked personal responsibility for a 
commercial transaction entered into on behalf of a government, see Jones v. Letombe, 3 U.S. 384, 385 
(1798). For a different approach, see Saorstat & Cont’l S.S. Co. v. de las Morenas, [1945] IR 291, 300 
(Ir.) (finding that a colonel in the Spanish army who had contracted to carry horses from Dublin to 
Lisbon for use by the Spanish army was not entitled to immunity because “[h]e is sued in his personal 
capacity and the judgment which has been, or any judgment which may hereafter be, obtained against 
him will bind merely the appellant personally”). 
 21.  See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 
3, ¶¶ 5354 (Feb. 14). 
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proceedings.22 Consequently, ratione materiae immunity persists beyond 
an individual’s term of office. 
The real debate centers on the scope of conduct-based or ratione 
materiae immunity for Category Two acts—that is, acts attributable to the 
state for which the individual official also bears personal responsibility. 
The rationale used to justify conduct-based immunity from legal 
consequences for Category One acts does not apply to Category Two acts 
because individuals bear personal responsibility for Category Two acts. At 
the same time, imposing legal consequences for Category Two acts can be 
more problematic than doing so for Category Three acts because Category 
Two acts are also attributable to the state. Consequently, some take the 
position that, because accepted doctrines of foreign sovereign immunity 
shield foreign states themselves from legal consequences for certain 
Category Two acts in other countries’ domestic courts, foreign official 
immunity necessarily shields state officials from foreign legal proceedings 
for the same acts.23 Others criticize this approach.24 
Discussions of the relationship between state responsibility and 
foreign official immunity often lack precision because they fail to 
distinguish among the three possible categories of acts. This is, in part, a 
relic of what Lady Fox has called the “classical” notion of attribution. The 
classical view “imputes the act solely to the State, who alone is responsible 
for its consequence. In consequence, any act performed by the individual as 
an act of the State enjoys the immunity which the State enjoys.”25 
However, as indicated above, only Category One acts are attributable solely 
to the state. The classical notion does not address the problem of Category 
Two acts because it denies the very existence of that category. 
Whether or not the classical notion was ever descriptively accurate, it 
is certainly no longer tenable. Clearly, officials may perform acts that are 
attributable to a foreign state and for which attribution does not discharge 
the individual from personal responsibility. These acts fall into Category 
Two. 
 
 22.  On the importance of distinguishing between conduct-based and status-based immunity, see, 
for example, Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 
61, 63–68 (2010). 
 23.  E.g., Roger O’Keefe, An “International Crime” Exception to the Immunity of State Officials 
From Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction: Not Currently, Not Likely, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 167 (2015). 
 24.  See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Horizontal Enforcement and the ILC’s Proposed Draft Articles 
on the Immunity of State Officials From Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 161 
(2015); William S. Dodge, Foreign Official Immunity in the International Law Commission: The 
Meanings of “Official Capacity”, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 156 (2015). 
 25.  HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 455 (2d ed. 2008). 
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Because the classical notion denies the existence of Category Two 
acts, it cannot provide meaningful guidance on the potential scope of 
conduct-based immunity for such acts. Under the classical view, conduct-
based immunity flows directly from the exclusive attribution of the act to 
the state. This explains why individuals who perform Category One acts 
might be shielded by conduct-based immunity or a functionally equivalent 
doctrine (because they do not bear personal responsibility for such acts). It 
does not, however, say anything about liability for acts that fall into 
Category Two. Cognizant of the shortcomings of the classical approach, 
courts and commentators have struggled with the contours of conduct-
based immunity for acts in Category Two. 
In her Fourth Report on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign 
Criminal Jurisdiction, ILC Special Rapporteur Concepción Escobar 
Hernández notes that the attributability of an act to the state begins, but 
does not end, the inquiry into whether the individual who performed the act 
can claim ratione materiae immunity.26 This is because, as described 
further below, the characteristics that make an act attributable to the state 
for purposes of state responsibility are much broader than those that 
warrant shielding an individual alleged to have performed such an act from 
the exercise of foreign jurisdiction.27 Thus, the mere attributability of an act 
to the state is an inadequate touchstone, both conceptually and doctrinally, 
for determining whether a foreign official is entitled to claim conduct-
based immunity for that act. 
B. Developing Principles of State Responsibility 
The International Law Commission (ILC) developed the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility over an almost forty-year period, from the 
project’s inception in 1956 to the adoption of the Draft Articles in 2001.28 
Codifying principles of state responsibility requires identifying 
characteristics that make an individual’s act attributable to the state. If an 
act is attributable to a state and violates an international obligation owed by 
that state, then the state is obliged to provide reparations. 
 
 26.  Concepción Escobar Hernández (Special Rapporteur on Immunity of State Officials From 
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction), Fourth Rep. on the Immunity of State Officials From Foreign Criminal 
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 111–35, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/686 (May 29, 2015). 
 27.  The Special Rapporteur’s mandate only involves examining immunity from foreign criminal 
jurisdiction, so her analysis does not address the question of individual civil responsibility (or whether it 
makes sense to differentiate between individual civil and criminal responsibility). Id. ¶ 110. 
 28.  JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES 1 (2002). 
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The 2001 Draft Articles state explicitly in Article 58 that they “are 
without prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility under 
international law of any person acting on behalf of a State.”29 As ILC 
Special Rapporteur James Crawford indicates in his commentary to the 
Draft Articles: 
 
The principle that individuals, including State officials, may be 
responsible under international law was established in the aftermath of 
World War II . . . . So far this principle has operated in the field of 
criminal responsibility, but it is not excluded that development may 
occur in the field of individual civil responsibility. As a saving clause 
article 58 is not intended to exclude that possibility hence the use of the 
general term “individual responsibility.”30 
 
Emphasizing that state and individual responsibility are separate concepts 
allowed the ILC to avoid theorizing or elucidating the relationship between 
the two, which was beyond the scope of its mandate at the time.31 
Special Rapporteur Escobar Hernández has identified “[t]he 
relationship between immunity, on the one hand, and the responsibility of 
States and the criminal responsibility of individuals, on the other” as a 
“general issue[] of a methodological and conceptual nature” confronting 
the ILC in its current work on the immunity of state officials from foreign 
criminal jurisdiction.32 Yet a more complete understanding of these 
relationships remains elusive in the ILC’s reports and more generally,33 in 
part because the Special Rapporteur’s current mandate is limited to 
examining immunity from foreign criminal proceedings, not other types of 
legal consequences.34 
 
 29.  2001 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 17, art. 58. 
 30.  CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at 312. 
 31.  Cf. Paola Gaeta, On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide?, 18 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 631, 643 (2007) (noting that “[o]nly by recognizing that criminal responsibility is one 
thing and state responsibility is quite another is it possible fully to bring to fruition the notion that there 
is—under international law—a dual regime of responsibility for serious violations of human rights and 
other norms of concern for the international community as such”). 
 32.  Concepción Escobar Hernández (Special Rapporteur on Immunity of State Officials From 
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction), ¶ 6, Second Rep. on the Immunity of State Officials From Foreign 
Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/661 (Apr. 4, 2013). 
 33.  See, e.g., BÉATRICE I. BONAFÈ, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 5 (2009) (observing that “[a]lthough the existence of a 
system of dual responsibility is widely acknowledged, there are hardly any theoretical inquiries 
shedding light on their mutual relationship”). 
 34.  See generally Hernández, supra note 26. I have proposed an integrated approach to the 
various types of legal consequences individuals may face for conduct that is attributable to a foreign 
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The conceptual and jurisprudential framework of the ILC’s Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility is rooted in the international law of 
diplomatic protection and the settlement of international claims brought on 
behalf of injured aliens. Much of the ILC’s early consideration of this issue 
involved defining the nature of state responsibility. A brief consideration of 
this history illustrates why a satisfying account of foreign official immunity 
must differentiate not only among types of acts, but also among types of 
responsibility. Although the present contribution focuses on the first 
distinction, it is worth noting the implications of the second. 
The ILC’s first Special Rapporteur on state responsibility, Francisco 
García-Amador, noted that state responsibility in “traditional doctrine and 
practice” was regarded as “the consequence of the breach of an 
international obligation,” and “implied for the State a ‘duty to make 
reparation’ for the injury sustained by the alien.”35 In this sense, “the term 
‘responsibility’ was identified with the ‘liability’ (responsabilité civile) of 
municipal law.”36 Under the traditional conception, as articulated by 
Dionisio Anzilotti in 1928, 
 
When a wrongful act—by which is meant, as a rule, the violation of an 
international right—is committed, the consequence is that a new 
relationship comes into existence, in law, between the State to which the 
act is imputable (that State being under a duty to make reparation) and 
the State with respect to which there exists an unperformed obligation 
(this State having a claim to reparation).37 
 
Domestic law differentiates between civil responsibility (entailing a duty of 
reparation) and criminal responsibility (warranting the imposition of 
sanctions). In Anzilotti’s view, a state could owe a duty of reparation to 
another state, but it could not owe a duty akin to that arising under 
municipal criminal law.38 
 
State. See Chimène I. Keitner, Prosecute, Sue, or Deport? Transnational Accountability in 
International Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2015). 
 35.  1 F.V. GARCÍA-AMADOR, THE CHANGING LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 88 (1984). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 89 (quoting DIONISIO ANZILOTTI, 1 CORSO DE DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 416 (3d ed. 
1928)); see also André Nollkaemper, Concurrence Between Individual Responsibility and State 
Responsibility in International Law, 52 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 615, 616 (2003) (noting that 
“[t]raditionally, international law attributes acts of individuals who act as state organs exclusively to the 
state. . . . State responsibility neither depends on nor implies the legal responsibility of individuals”). 
 38.  GARCÍA-AMADOR, supra note 35, at 91 (quoting ANZILOTTI, supra note 37, at 416).  
Interestingly, Anzilotti took the view that, in “an earlier stage of social history . . . compensation was 
also a penalty” as a matter of municipal law, because “the State was a[s] yet powerless to assert itself as 
the guardian of the law” by imposing criminal consequences. Id. (quoting ANZILOTTI, supra note 37, at 
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The distinction between duties of reparation and other legal duties is 
important for the law of foreign official immunity because the nature of the 
responsibility borne by the state is not identical to, and does not subsume, 
that borne by an individual official. Under the traditional view of state 
responsibility, an injurious Category One or Category Two act creates a 
new relationship between the state to which the act is imputable and 
another state. Importantly, however, an injurious Category Two act may 
also create a new relationship between the individual wrongdoer and the 
person sustaining the injury (civil responsibility), and between the 
individual wrongdoer and the relevant community (criminal 
responsibility).39 
At various points, the ILC contemplated expanding its conception of 
state responsibility to encompass criminal dimensions, citing the occasional 
award of punitive damages against states in arbitral decisions.40 Special 
Rapporteur García-Amador noted that, following the Second World War, 
“the idea of international criminal responsibility had become sufficiently 
characterized and so widely acknowledged that it had to be admitted as one 
of the consequences of the breach of certain international obligations.”41 
The idea that states might also bear criminal responsibility led to the 
controversial distinction proposed in previous Draft Article 19, which was 
provisionally adopted in 1976 under the stewardship of Special Rapporteur 
Roberto Ago, between “international crimes” and “international delicts.”42 
Ultimately, however, the ILC abandoned this idea and settled on an 
understanding that certain international obligations may be owed to the 
international community as a whole (erga omnes) rather than to a particular 
state, and that certain violations might amount to particularly grave or 
 
416). See also id. at 92 n.104 (citing HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 116–17 
(1952)) (noting Kelsen’s view that State responsibility is neither civil nor criminal in nature, because 
general international law does not differentiate between the two). 
 39.  See id. (quoting ANZILOTTI, supra note 37, at 416) (noting that, in municipal law, an unlawful 
act gives rise both to a relationship between “the person committing [the act]—or rather the person to 
whom the law imputes the act—and the person sustaining the injury” and a relationship between the 
person committing the act and “the community represented by the State”). I am exploring these 
questions further as part of ongoing work with the International Law Association Study Group on 
Individual Responsibility in International Law, which I co-chair with Lorna McGregor. 
 40.  Georg Nolte, From Dionisio Anzilotti to Roberto Ago: The Classical International Law of 
State Responsibility and the Traditional Primacy of a Bilateral Conception of Inter-State Relations, 13 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1083, 1092 (2002). 
 41.  GARCÍA-AMADOR, supra note 35, at 92. 
 42.  Id. at 94–95; see also THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 179–206 (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 1991). On the distinction between Anzilotti’s and 
Ago’s conceptions of state responsibility, see Nolte, supra note 40, at 1092. 
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serious breaches under the law of state responsibility.43 These 
developments proceeded without prejudice to the potentially concurrent 
civil or criminal responsibility of individuals whose acts are attributable to 
states. 
The ILC finally adopted its 2001 Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility under the stewardship of Special Rapporteur James 
Crawford.44 State responsibility continued to elude categorization as either 
civil or criminal in nature. That said, as noted above, the inclusion of 
Article 58 as a saving clause in the 2001 Draft Articles left open the 
possibility of individual criminal and/or civil responsibility for acts that are 
also attributable to a state, and for which such attribution does not 
discharge the individual from personal responsibility—that is, for acts in 
Category Two. 
C. Attributing Acts to the State 
The 2001 Draft Articles had the important effect of expanding the 
circumstances under which an individual’s act would fall into Category 
Two instead of Category Three. As described below, the ILC decided to 
adopt broad rules of attribution as part of an expansive approach to the 
conditions under which a state would incur responsibility for the acts of 
individuals under international law. Under such an approach, as Charles de 
Visscher noted long ago, it is irrelevant whether a state agent acted based 
on public or private motives, or whether the agent was or was not 
authorized by the state to engage in the injurious act. “It is sufficient, for 
international responsibility to exist, that the guilty agent abused the 
authority or means that were at his disposal on account of his official 
status.”45 Draft Article 7 codified this approach by providing that “[t]he 
 
 43.  See CRAWFORD, supra note 28, at 20. André Nollkaemper suggests that “[t]he emergence of 
this category of [peremptory] norms [with an erga omnes character] underlies both the individualisation 
of responsibility and the disruption of the unity of state responsibility.” Nollkaemper, supra note 37, at 
631. 
 44.  See generally Alan Nissel, The Duality of State Responsibility, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
793, 837–44 (2013) (noting that the 2001 articles represent a blend of García-Amador’s conception of 
State responsibility as rooted in the “regional practice of alien protection” and reparation, and Ago’s 
notion of a “universal doctrine of State responsibility”); Marina Spinedi, International Crimes of State: 
The Legislative History, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE—A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC’S 
DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 7 (Joseph H. H. Weiler et al. eds., 1989) (detailing the 
process leading up to the adoption of draft article 19). 
 45.  Charles de Visscher, Notes sur la responsabilité internationale des états et la protection 
diplomatique d’après quelques documents récents, 8 REV. DROIT INT’L & LEGIS. COMP. (3d ser.) 245, 
253 (1927) (author’s trans.) (“Il suffit, pour qu’il y ait responsabilité internationale, que l’agent 
coupable ait abusé de l’autorité ou de la force matérielle dont il disposait en vertu de son caractère 
official.”). 
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conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to 
exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act 
of the State under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that 
capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.”46 
The ILC’s decision to attribute ultra vires acts to the state was not a 
foregone conclusion. State practice on attribution varied, as evidenced by 
the different approaches to attribution in the Tunstall and Mallén disputes, 
among others. As one might expect, states called upon to account for the 
egregious acts of their officials often disclaimed responsibility and 
endorsed a narrow approach to attribution. By contrast, states espousing 
claims on behalf of their injured nationals articulated broader criteria for 
attributing harmful acts by officials to the respondent state. As described 
below, Tunstall and Mallén illustrate the narrow and broad approaches to 
attribution, respectively. 
1. Tunstall 
The United States’ response to the United Kingdom’s claim for 
reparations in the Tunstall case illustrates a narrow approach to attribution. 
In that case, as described above, a posse pursued and shot John Tunstall, a 
British subject, in the U.S. territory of New Mexico in the course of serving 
a writ authorizing the sheriff to seize Tunstall’s property and livestock.47 
The U.S. Department of Justice sent Judge Frank Warner Angel to 
investigate,48 but the United Kingdom maintained that the federal 
government should also indemnify Tunstall’s father given his inability “to 
recover damages from the Territorial Government of New Mexico by 
proceedings at law or otherwise.”49 U.S. Secretary of State Thomas Bayard 
responded that Tunstall’s injury was not a suitable basis for a diplomatic 
claim because Tunstall’s father had not exhausted local remedies.50 
 
 46.  2001 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 17, art. 7. 
 47.  Letter from Secretary of State Bayard, supra note 15, at 450; see Theodor Meron, 
International Responsibility of States for Unauthorized Acts of Their Officials, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 
85, 90–91 (1957). 
 48.  See IN THE MATTER OF THE CAUSE AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DEATH OF JOHN H. 
TUNSTALL, A BRITISH SUBJECT: REPORT OF FRANK WARNER ANGEL, SPECIAL AGENT, 44-4-8-3, 
Record Grp. 60, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. (Dep’t of Justice Oct. 1878). 
 49.  Letter from Secretary of State Bayard, supra note 15, at 451 (quoting Sir Edward Thornton’s 
note of June 23, 1880). 
 50.  Id. at 453 (arguing that “in countries subject to the English common law, where there is the 
opportunity given of a prompt trial by a jury of the vicinage, damages inflicted on foreigners on the soil 
of such countries must be redressed through the instrumentality of courts of justice, and are not the 
subject of diplomatic intervention by the sovereign of the injured party”). 
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Secretary Bayard also disputed the United Kingdom’s assertion that 
the United States bore legal responsibility for Tunstall’s death: 
 
Killing, in personal malice, by an officer, of a defendant in a civil 
process in such officer’s hands, such killing being subsequent to the 
execution of the writ, is as collateral to the official action of the officer 
as would be the commission of arson against the dwelling, or rape of a 
member of the family, of the party [defendant] by such an officer after 
the civil process had been served.51 
 
Bayard took the position that the United States could not be held 
responsible for an act that was “wholly outside the scope of the agency.”52 
In sum, in his view, “[t]he injury complained of is a personal tort . . . For 
such a tort the guilty party may be properly pursued and punished. But it 
was not an act of the Government.”53 Bayard seemed to think it was self-
evident that the sheriff and the posse’s acts were not attributable to the U.S. 
government—in other words, that they fell into Category Three rather than 
Category Two. The U.K. government, which was espousing the claim for 
damages on behalf of its injured national, took the opposite view and 
advocated a broader approach to delineating Category Two. 
The United States took a similarly narrow approach to attribution in 
other cases involving injuries inflicted by U.S. officials that gave rise to 
reparations claims. In a later case involving U.S. officials’ illegal seizure of 
arms aboard a foreign ship, for example, U.S. Attorney General John 
Griggs opined that “the torts of an officer may subject him to suit, but, not 
being within his orders as agent of the Government, the latter is not 
responsible for them.”54 In these and other cases, the debate was not about 
whether the individual could be held personally liable for the injurious acts. 
Rather, the debate was about whether the state also bore responsibility—
that is, whether the acts were properly categorized as falling within 
Category Two or Category Three. A narrow approach to attribution limited 
 
 51.  Tunstall’s Case, supra note 3, at 664 (alternation in original). See also When Remedy is 
Judicial, 2 WHARTON’S DIGEST, ch. 9, §241, at 679–93. 
 52.  Letter from Secretary of State Bayard, supra note 15, at 458. 
 53.  Id. In an attempt to reconcile the United States’ position with a broad attribution rule, the 
ILC’s 1975 Commentary characterized the conduct at issue in the Tunstall case as an “injurious act 
having in practice been performed by an organ acting in a purely private capacity”—in other words, as 
a Category Three act. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 27 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 62 n.42, U.N. Doc. A/10010/Rev.1 (1975), reprinted in [1975] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1975/Add.1 [hereinafter 1975 ILC Draft Articles]. 
 54.  Seal Fisheries–Bering Sea, 22 Op. Att’y Gen. 64, 69 (1900). 
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Category Two acts to those that were “within [the] orders” of a government 
agent, and characterized all other acts as falling within Category Three. 
2. Mallén 
A narrow construction of Category Two allows a respondent state to 
disclaim responsibility for its agent’s harmful act by asserting that the act 
fell outside the scope of the agent’s authority. However, despite the 
existence of some state practice supporting a narrow approach, other states 
and tribunals have rejected it, including the General Claims Commission 
established in 1923 by the United States and Mexico to adjudicate 
outstanding claims for diplomatic protection between the two countries.55 
One of the unresolved claims subject to arbitration was Mexico’s claim on 
behalf of its consul, Mallén, for injuries inflicted by deputy constable 
Franco. The arbitral tribunal in Mallén agreed with Mexico that certain 
injurious acts performed by Franco with apparent authority fell into 
Category Two, not Category Three. 
Three days before Christmas, in December 1910, the El Paso Herald 
reported that Captain Rogers of the Texas state rangers had arrived in town 
as the Governor’s special representative.56 Francisco Mallén, the former 
Mexican consul in El Paso, had brought a claim against the United States 
for $100,000. Mallén alleged that he had been assaulted and seriously 
injured by Juán Franco, a Texas deputy constable.57 As noted above, 
Franco was convinced that Mallén had intentionally thwarted the 
extradition of a man alleged to have killed Franco’s relative in the United 
States.58 Franco first assaulted Mallén by slapping him in the face. Several 
weeks later, Franco allegedly attempted to arrest Mallén for carrying a 
concealed weapon. When Mallén refused to surrender the weapon, Franco 
allegedly beat him, causing serious injuries including permanent damage to 
his eyesight.59 
The arbitral panel issued its decision in 1927. It determined that the 
United States bore international responsibility for the second attack.60 By 
contrast, the initial slap was “a malevolent and unlawful act of a private 
 
 55.  See General Claims Convention (Mex./U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 7 (Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1923). 
 56.  Governor Sends Capt. Rogers to Report on Former Consul’s Case, EL PASO HERALD, Dec. 
22, 1910, at 1. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id.; see also Francisco Mallen Wants Indemnity: Pushing His Claims for His Alleged Injuries, 
EL PASO MORNING TIMES, Dec. 22, 1910, at 1 [hereinafter Francisco Mallen Wants Indemnity]. 
 59.  Francisco Mallen Wants Indemnity, supra note 58; see also Alleged Conspiracy of Mexican 
Consul: Some Heretofore Unpublished History in the Sensational Mallen-Franco Feud, EL PASO 
MORNING TIMES, Dec. 14, 1909, at 1–2. 
 60.  See Mallén (Mex.) v. United States, 4 R.I.A.A. 173, 181 (Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1927). 
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individual who happened to be an official; not the act of an official”61—in 
other words, a Category Three act for which the United States was not 
responsible. 
The arbitral panel characterized the second attack as falling into 
Category Two and giving rise to state responsibility because, in beating 
Mallén and purporting to arrest him, Franco had “misus[ed] his official 
capacity”62 as a deputy constable. Unlike in the Tunstall case, “both 
Governments consider[ed] Franco’s acts as the acts of an official on 
duty . . . [and] the evidence establishe[d] his showing his badge to assert his 
official capacity.”63 This was so even though the arrest was “a mere pretext 
for taking private vengeance.”64 Contrary to the United States’ suggestion 
in Tunstall that acts motivated by “personal malice” belong in Category 
Three, the Mallén tribunal found that Franco’s abuse of official authority 
gave rise to both individual and state responsibility. 
Mexico also claimed that the United States was responsible for a 
“denial of justice” because it had not afforded Mallén adequate redress for 
his injuries. The panel determined that the allegedly insufficient $100 fine 
imposed on Franco did not constitute a denial of justice; however, the lack 
of evidence that Franco actually paid the fine (or that he was committed to 
jail for non-payment) amounted to a compensable denial.65 In addition, 
Franco’s appointment as a deputy sheriff following the termination of his 
appointment as a deputy constable amounted to a failure to provide the 
protection owed a foreign consul.66 The panel ultimately entered an award 
of $18,000 against the United States. 
The ILC cited the 1927 Mallén arbitral decision in support of its 
decision to adopt a broad attribution rule,67 even though the ILC recognized 
that such a rule was not supported by uniform state practice. The ILC 
preferred the broad rule because it was easier to administer (since it did not 
require ascertaining the exact parameters of an official’s authority or 
instructions), and because it was less susceptible to manipulation (since 
states could not evade responsibility by arguing that an injurious act was 
beyond the scope of the official’s authority or contravened municipal 
 
 61.  Id. at 174–75. 
 62.  Id. at 175. 
 63.  Id. at 177. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See id. at 178. 
 66.  See id. 
 67.  2001 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 17, art. 7 ¶ 5 n.147. 
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law).68 The ILC did not, however, consider or envision that a broad 
attribution rule for state responsibility would be used to support broad 
conduct-based immunity for state officials from the jurisdiction of foreign 
courts. 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF A BROAD ATTRIBUTION RULE 
A. The Decision to Attribute Ultra Vires Acts to the State 
As indicated above, state practice did not uniformly favor a broad 
attribution rule. States embraced contradictory rules depending on whether 
they were espousing a claim on behalf of an injured national or defending 
against such a claim. For example, although Mexico supported a broad 
attribution rule in the Mallén case, it took a different position in the 1926 
Youmans arbitration. In Youmans, Mexico argued that it should not be held 
liable for the acts of Mexican soldiers who, instead of protecting American 
citizens from an angry mob, opened fire and participated in the mob 
violence, resulting in the deaths of three Americans.69 
Mexico argued that the soldiers’ acts were not imputable to Mexico 
because they fell outside the scope of the soldiers’ competency and 
exceeded their powers. The tribunal rejected this argument on the grounds 
that, under Mexico’s approach, “it would follow that no wrongful acts 
committed by an official could be considered as acts for which his 
Government could be held liable,” because such acts would always fall 
“outside the scope of [the official’s] competency.”70 Mexico also argued 
against attribution to the state because, in its view, the soldiers’ misconduct 
amounted to “malicious acts . . . committed in their private capacity.”71 The 
tribunal rejected this characterization, noting that “[t]here could be no 
liability whatever for such misdeeds if the view were taken that any acts 
committed by soldiers in contravention of instructions must always be 
considered as personal acts.”72 The Youmans panel, like the Mallén panel, 
viewed a narrow attribution rule as too susceptible to manipulation by the 
respondent state, which would invariably seek to avoid state responsibility 
by arguing that an injurious act belonged in Category Three (giving rise 
 
 68.  According to the ILC’s 1975 Report, State practice tilted in favor of attributing ultra vires 
acts with the 1926 decision in the Youmans case between the United States and Mexico, and the 1929 
decision in the Caire case between France and Mexico. 1975 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 53, art. 10 ¶ 
19. 
 69.  See Youmans (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 110, 116 (Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1926). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
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solely to personal responsibility) rather than Category Two (giving rise 
both to personal and to state responsibility). 
The arbitral decision in the often-cited Caire case, which was brought 
by France against Mexico, articulated similar reasoning and cited the 
unanimous decision in Youmans in support of a broad attribution rule.73 
The French-Mexican Claims Commission was established to adjust claims 
brought on behalf of French nationals for losses incurred during the 
Mexican Revolution of 19101920.74 In the Caire case, France brought a 
claim on behalf of the widow and children of Frenchman Jean-Baptiste 
Caire, who was murdered in the Mexican village of San Bártolo 
Naucálpam in 1914.75 The Presiding Commissioner, Jan Hendrik Willem 
Verzijl, was a respected Dutch jurist who held the Chair of International 
Law at Utrecht.76 In the face of procedural disputes and a lack of 
cooperation from Mexico (culminating in the absence of the Mexican 
Commissioner), Verzijl “found himself formulating, practically single-
handed, the principles of State responsibility to be imposed upon a 
refractory government.”77 Verzijl’s opinion in the Caire case, written in 
these difficult circumstances, represents a locus classicus for the rule 
attributing ultra vires acts to the state. 
Jean-Baptiste Caire met an unhappy end. General Tomás Urbina was a 
close ally of revolutionary Pancho Villa, who joined forces with Emiliano 
Zapata and entered Mexico City on December 6, 1914. Five days later, a 
commander in Urbina’s brigade, Everardo Ávila, appeared with two armed 
soldiers at Caire’s boarding-house and demanded that he pay an exorbitant 
sum equivalent to $5,000. Caire managed to scrape together only $200 after 
having been detained and threatened by the officers. The officers executed 
Caire, along with another innocent man who had tried to help him.78 
The Mexican National Claims Commission denied compensation to 
Caire’s widow, who subsequently presented a claim to the French-Mexican 
Commission.79 In an opinion written by Presiding Commissioner Verzijl 
 
 73.  Estate of Caire (Fr.) v. United Mexican States, 5 R.I.A.A. 516, 529 n.1 (1929). 
 74.  See Convention Between France and the United Mexican States, Sept. 25, 1924, 79 L.N.T.S. 
418. The Commission operated without a Mexican Commissioner from June 324, 1929. Historical 
Note, 5 R.I.A.A. 309 (2006). During this interval, the Presiding Commissioner and the French 
Commissioner affirmed their jurisdiction to sit as a two-member tribunal and entered awards in twenty-
three cases, including the Caire case. Id. 
 75.  Caire, 5 R.I.A.A. at 517. 
 76.  See C.G. Roelofsen, Jan Hendrik Willem Verzijl, in 12 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE, at xviiixix (1998). 
 77.  Id. at xx. 
 78.  See Caire, 5 R.I.A.A. at 51718. 
 79.  Id. at 51617. 
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and joined by the French Commissioner, the Commission found that Caire 
was murdered by officers serving in revolutionary (Villista) forces that had 
never actually come to power—a category that might not ordinarily be 
treated as equivalent to government’s own army,80 but that fell within the 
scope of Article III(2) of the agreement establishing the Commission.81 
In awarding an indemnity in favor of Caire’s widow, the Commission 
held that Mexico bore state responsibility for the soldiers’ conduct, even 
though the soldiers had violated orders and exceeded their authority. The 
tribunal approached the question of Mexico’s responsibility “in light of the 
general principles that govern the conditions for the international 
responsibility of States for the acts of their public officials in general.”82 
Observing that jurists were moving away from fault-based conceptions of 
state responsibility towards a more “objective” regime, the tribunal 
endorsed an approach under which a state bears responsibility under 
international law “for all acts committed by its agents (fonctionnaires) or 
organs that constitute unlawful acts under international law, regardless of 
whether the agent or organ in question acted within the limits of its 
competence or exceeded such limits.”83 
Under this conception, ultra vires acts are not considered acts of the 
state in a strict sense, because “[t]he act of an official lacking competence 
is not an act of the State.”84 However, ultra vires acts are still attributable to 
the state for the purpose of state responsibility because foreign states 
cannot be expected to know, or to figure out, which acts do or do not fall 
within the actual competence of a domestic official.85 Consequently, as 
long as an act is performed with “apparent authority” or under “color of 
 
 80.  Id. at 529. 
 81.  Id. at 534. Article 3(2) of the Convention Between France and the United Mexican States, 
supra note 74, provided that the Commission could award damages for acts performed by a variety of 
forces, including “revolutionary forces opposed to” revolutionary forces that, following their victory, 
established either de jure or de facto governments. 
 82.  Caire, 5 R.I.A.A. at 528 (author’s trans.) (“à la lueur des principes généraux qui régissent les 
conditions de la responsabilité internationale des Etats pour les actes de leurs fonctionnaires publics en 
general”). 
 83.  Id. at 52930 (author’s trans.) (“tous les actes commis par ses fonctionnaires ou organes et 
qui constituent des actes délictueux au point de vue du droit des gens, n’importe que le fonctionnaire ou 
l’organe en question ait agi dans les limites de sa competence ou en les excédant”). 
 84.  Id. at 530 (author’s trans.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Observations de 
Maurice Bourquin, 1 ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 50708 (1927)). The 
tribunal also noted that the Institut endorsed a broad attribution rule in a 1927 resolution. Id. 
 85.  Id. (noting that ultra vires acts are attributable to the State “pour une raison propre au 
mécanisme de la vie internationale,” namely because “les rapports internationaux deviendraient trop 
difficiles, trop compliqués et trop peu sûrs, si l’on obligeait les Etats étrangers à tenir compte des 
dispositions juridiques, souvent complexes, qui fixent les compétences à l’intérieur de l’Etat”). 
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law”—the appearance, if not the reality, of state authority—it falls within 
Category Two.86 Because Caire’s murder met these criteria, it was 
attributable to Mexico for the purpose of state responsibility.87 
In the end, the ILC adopted the expansive attribution rule reflected in 
the Youmans and Caire decisions, notwithstanding conflicting state 
practice.88 In an article he wrote as a graduate student, international law 
professor and international criminal tribunal judge Theodor Meron 
described the principle that emerged as follows: “If an official purports to 
act within his apparent authority, the State is responsible even if the official 
has exceeded his competence; provided, of course, that the act, if 
authorized, would be internationally wrongful.”89 The ILC’s Commentary 
to Draft Article 7 rationalized its codification of this rule as follows: 
 
The rule evolved in response to the need for clarity and security in 
international relations. Despite early equivocal statements in diplomatic 
practice and by arbitral tribunals, State practice came to support the 
proposition, articulated by the British Government in response to an 
Italian request, that “all Governments should always be held responsible 
for all acts committed by their agents by virtue of their official 
capacity.”90 
 
In adopting Draft Article 7, the ILC’s dual mandate of codification and 
progressive development of the law led it to endorse one strand of state 
practice over another. 
The ILC’s decision to place ultra vires acts in Category Two rather 
than Category Three also entailed adopting a broad definition of “official 
capacity” for attribution purposes. The 1975 Commentary noted that the 
question of “[t]he attribution or non-attribution to the State of the conduct 
 
 86.  As Anzilotti stated, “Due cose si possono ritenere per certe: la prima, che un atto di questo 
genere non è in alcun modo un atto dello Stato, ma un puro atto individuale; l’altra, che il diritto 
internazionale positive afferma in modo non dubbio la responsabilità dello Stato per i fatti illeciti dei 
funzionari, anche quando sono stati compiuti illegalmente e fuori della respettiva competenza.” Id. at 
530 n.1 (quoting DIONISIO ANZILOTTI, TEORIA GENERALE DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ DELLO STATO NEL 
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 167–68 (1902)). 
 87.  See id. at 531. 
 88.  The Caire decision, and the ILC, also rejected the narrow approach advocated by Gustavo 
Guerrero and Wang Chung-Hui in their 1926 Report on behalf of the ILC’s predecessor, the Committee 
of Experts for the Progressive Development of International Law. League of Nations Doc. C. 46.M.23. 
See Caire, 5 R.I.A.A. at 53031. 
 89.  Meron, supra note 47, at 94. 
 90.  2001 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 17, art. 7 ¶ 3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (also 
citing the response of the Spanish government and a note verbale by Duke Almódovar del Rio, Archivio 
del Ministero degli Affari esteri italiano, serie politica P, No. 43 (1898) (on file with author)); see also 
1975 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 53, art. 10 ¶ 7. 
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of organs which acted in their official capacity but outside their 
competence under internal law . . . had been one of the questions most 
keenly debated among international lawyers.”91 The term “official 
capacity” in this context meant acting with apparent authority. The Caire 
decision referred to acting “at least apparently as competent agents or 
organs,”92 while Special Rapporteur García-Amador used terms such as 
“purport[ing] to be acting by virtue of [one’s] official capacity,”93 or acting 
“‘under cover of [one’s] official character,’ although possibly in excess of 
[one’s] functions.”94 Those who favored a broad attribution rule recognized 
that state officials could still perform Category Three acts if they acted “in 
a capacity wholly unrelated to [their] office or function.”95 Even under a 
broad approach, acts that “had no relationship with the official function”96 
were not attributable to the state, and were treated as the acts of a private 
individual. 
The ILC explained that it adopted the expansive rule “on the basis of 
the data provided by State practice and international judicial decisions, and 
also bearing in mind the requirements of modern international life”97—
what the Caire decision had called “une raison propre au mécanisme de la 
vie internationale.”98 The ILC’s 1975 Report notes candidly in its review of 
state practice that “[a]t times the legal departments of States give the 
impression of groping in the dark for a definition of principles, and not of 
having always had clear and distinct criteria in view.”99 As for arbitral 
awards, “the criteria adopted vary from case to case and the reasons given 
for the decisions sometimes reveal a confusion of thought which does not 
make for easy interpretation.”100 Some of this variation might simply 
represent the “shoe-on-the-other-foot” phenomenon, as states often sought 
to define responsibility narrowly when they were on the receiving end of 
international claims, and more broadly when they were bringing claims on 
 
 91.  1975 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 53, art. 10 ¶ 3. 
 92.  Caire, 5 R.I.A.A. at 530 (author’s trans.) (“au moins apparemment commes des 
fonctionnaires ou organes compétents”). 
 93.  F.V. García-Amador (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Second Rep. on State 
Responsibility, 107, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/106 (Feb. 15, 1957). 
 94.  Id. at 110. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Caire, 5 R.I.A.A. at 531 (author’s trans.) (indicating that the State would only escape 
responsibility “dans le seul cas où l’acte n’a eu aucun rapport avec la function officielle et n’a été, en 
réalité, qu’un acte d’un particulier”). 
 97.  1975 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 53, art. 10 ¶ 3. 
 98.  Caire, 5 R.I.A.A. at 530. 
 99.  1975 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 53, art. 10 ¶ 5. 
 100.  Id. art. 10 ¶ 12. 
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behalf of their nationals, as illustrated above. It might also reflect the 
conceptual difficulty in attributing acts beyond an official’s competence to 
the state for purposes of state responsibility, even though such acts might 
not be treated as acts of the state in other contexts.101 
In sum, the question for the Draft Articles on State Responsibility was 
where to draw the line between Category Two and Category Three acts—a 
task that occupied several successive Special Rapporteurs on State 
responsibility. For example, previous Draft Article 10 included in the ILC’s 
1975 Report provided for the “[a]ttribution to the State of conduct of 
organs acting outside their competence or contrary to instructions 
concerning their activity.”102 The ILC’s Commentary noted that “these 
provisions apply, of course, only to conduct which the persons constituting 
the organs have adopted in performing their functions as members of those 
organs and not as private individuals.”103 By contrast, acts of those persons 
“performed in their capacity as private individuals” are “never attributable 
to the State even if their perpetrators have used, in the case in question, the 
means—including weapons—placed at their disposal by the State for the 
exercise of their functions.”104 
The ILC’s 1975 Report emphasized that the driving rationale for a 
broad attribution rule was that a narrower rule “would make it all too easy 
for the State to evade its international responsibility.”105 This rationale also 
led the ILC to propose, contrary to earlier suggestions, that acts 
“manifestly” outside an agent’s competence would still be attributable to 
the state. The ILC included such acts in Category Two because “the fact of 
knowing that the organ engaging in unlawful conduct is either exceeding its 
competence, or contravening its instructions, [does] not enable the victim 
of such conduct to escape its harmful consequences.”106 Excluding such 
acts from Category Two would “run the unpardonable risk of presenting 
the State with an easy loophole in particularly serious cases where its 
 
 101.  See supra note 86. 
 102.  1975 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 53, art. 10. 
 103.  Id. art. 10 ¶ 1. 
 104.  Id. art. 10 ¶ 2; see also JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 136–
40 (2013). Crawford differentiates between acts that are simply made possible “by virtue of [an 
official’s] position,” which might not be attributable to the State under the 2001 Draft Articles, and 
those in which the official “h[e]ld himself out as acting on behalf of the state,” which are attributable to 
the State even if the official exceeded his actual authority. Id. at 138. 
 105.  1975 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 53, art. 10 ¶ 18. On the other hand, certain States, 
“particularly the Latin American States, had opposed the principle because they thought they were not 
treated on an equal footing by other States and were continually subject to interference in their domestic 
affairs by foreign powers.” Id. art. 10 ¶ 19. 
 106.  Id. art. 10 ¶ 25. 
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international responsibility ought to be affirmed”107—for example, if a head 
of state manifestly violated municipal law by starting a war of 
aggression.108 
The ILC retained this approach in its 2001 Draft Articles in the name 
of “clarity and security in international relations,”109 emphasizing that a 
narrow approach would allow “a State [to] rely on its internal law in order 
to argue that conduct, in fact carried out by its organs, was not attributable 
to it.”110 The ILC opted to make all acts performed with apparent authority 
attributable to the state in order to avoid the need to determine the content 
of internal law regarding the scope of an agent’s actual authority, and in 
order to preclude spurious denials of state responsibility on the grounds that 
an agent exceeded her authority. 
In addition to citing early arbitral decisions in support of a broad 
attribution rule, the ILC’s 2001 Commentary to Draft Article 7 cites the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ much more recent articulation of 
this approach in Velásquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras: 
 
This conclusion [that the Convention was breached] is independent of 
whether the organ or official has contravened provisions of internal law 
or overstepped the limits of his authority: under international law a State 
is responsible for the acts of its agents undertaken in their official 
capacity and for their omissions, even when those agents act outside the 
sphere of their authority or violate internal law.111 
 
The ILC recognized that, at some point, any theory of attribution would 
have to draw the line between acts performed with “apparent authority” and 
those performed in a “private capacity”—in other words, between Category 
Two and Category Three acts. The 2001 Commentary emphasizes: 
 
Cases where officials acted in their capacity as such, albeit unlawfully or 
contrary to instructions, must be distinguished from cases where the 
conduct is so removed from the scope of their official functions that it 
should be assimilated to that of private individuals, not attributable to the 
State.112 
 
 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. art. 10 ¶ 25 n.92. 
 109.  2001 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 17, art. 7 ¶ 3. 
 110.  Id. art. 7 ¶ 2. 
 111.  Id. art. 7 ¶ 6 (quoting Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 4, ¶ 170 (July 29, 1988)). 
 112.  2001 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 17, art. 7 ¶ 7. 
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This line is not always easy to draw; the 2001 Commentary suggests 
distinguishing between these categories by asking whether the officials 
“were acting with apparent authority.”113 
The ILC adopted a broad attribution rule in the limited context, and 
for the limited purpose, of drawing the line between Category Two and 
Category Three acts. The attribution of acts beyond the scope of an agent’s 
actual authority to the state became entrenched as a bedrock principle of 
the law of state responsibility in Draft Article 7. The ILC’s decision to 
adopt an expansive definition of acts that fall into Category Two—as 
opposed to Category Three—was intended to serve two central goals: first, 
promoting state accountability by increasing predictability in resolving 
claims for diplomatic protection; and second, encouraging states to curb, 
punish, and provide remedies for their officials’ excesses, since an 
international claim could only be brought after exhausting local remedies. 
In the end, the ILC’s rule favored states espousing claims for diplomatic 
protection over states defending against claims for reparations; in so doing, 
it also favored the interests of those injured by the unlawful conduct of 
state officials. 
B. Unintended Consequences of a Broad Attribution Rule for the Potential 
Scope of Foreign Official Immunity 
The basic idea that both an individual and a state may bear 
responsibility for the same act is no longer controversial, even though the 
“classical” theory treated individual and state responsibility as mutually 
exclusive.114 As the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) observed in 
Jones v. United Kingdom, “There is no doubt that individuals may in 
certain circumstances also be personally liable for wrongful acts which 
engage the State’s responsibility.”115 In that case, the ECtHR found that the 
European Convention on Human Rights did not prevent the United 
Kingdom from granting immunity from civil proceedings to individual 
Saudi officials accused of torture, a Category Two act.116 The U.K. House 
 
 113.  Id. art. 7 ¶ 8. The tribunal in Caire would also have attributed acts in which the individuals 
“aient usé de pouvoirs ou de moyens propres à leur qualité officielle,” even if they did not act with 
apparent authority. Estate of Caire (Fr.) v. United Mexican States, 5 R.I.A.A. 516, 530 (1929). 
 114.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 115.  Jones v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 34356/06, 40528/06, ¶ 207, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014) 
(emphasis added). 
 116.  Bill Dodge, among others, has criticized this opinion for “mixing up state responsibility with 
official immunity despite Draft Article 58’s clear warning not to do so.” William S. Dodge, Is Torture 
an “Official Act?”—Reflections on Jones v. United Kingdom, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/01/15/guest-post-dodge-torture-official-act-reflections-jones-v-united-
kingdom/. 
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of Lords had denied permission to serve the defendants outside the 
jurisdiction based on its interpretation of the UK State Immunity Act, 
which does not apply to criminal proceedings.117 
In Jones, the House of Lords found that the State Immunity Act 
applies to civil claims brought in U.K. courts against an individual official 
if the challenged acts are attributable to a foreign state. Lord Bingham 
reasoned that “a civil action against individual torturers based on acts of 
official torture does indirectly implead the state since their acts are 
attributable to it.”118 In his view, whether or not the alleged acts were 
performed in accordance with, or contrary to, municipal or international 
law, their attributability to a foreign state under the 2001 Draft Articles 
brings the acts within the scope of conduct-based immunity.119 Similarly, 
Lord Hoffmann emphasized that “[t]he cases and other materials on state 
liability make it clear that the state is liable for acts done under colour of 
public authority, whether or not they are actually authorised or lawful 
under domestic law.”120 
Lords Bingham and Hoffmann’s reasoning assumes that Category 
Two acts should be treated like Category One acts where conduct-based 
immunity from civil (but not criminal) proceedings is concerned. This 
approach, which conflates Categories One and Two, fails to grapple with 
the reality that Category Two acts entail dual responsibility.121 Equating 
state responsibility with conduct-based immunity might be alluring because 
of its simplicity, but its results are demonstrably over-inclusive. As Special 
Rapporteur Escobar Hernández has noted, not all acts that are attributable 
to the state under the 2001 Draft Articles necessarily benefit from ratione 
materiae immunity, including certain acts performed by individuals who 
are not state officials (under Draft Articles 8, 9, or 11) or by members of an 
insurrectional movement that subsequently gains control of a state (under 
 
 117.  Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 AC (HL) 270 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 118.  Id. at [31] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill LJ) (emphasis added). 
 119.  Id. at [12]. 
 120.  Id. at [74] (Lord Hoffmann LJ). Lord Hoffmann cited Mallén as standing for the proposition 
that “the United States was liable because the deputy constable had acted under colour of public 
authority” even though “the assault was in pursuit of a private grudge.” Id. at [75]. As indicated above, 
the tribunal in Mallén found that Franco’s first attack on Mallén fell into Category Three, and that the 
second attack belonged in Category Two. 
 121.  See, e.g., Lorna McGregor, Jones v. UK: A Disappointing End, EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 16, 2014), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/jones-v-uk-a-disappointing-end/ (noting that “[t]he better way of looking at the 
issue is to ask whether subject-matter immunity applies in cases – such as torture – in which the 
underlying allegations if proven would attract the dual responsibility of the state and the individual”); 
Lorna McGregor, State Immunity and Human Rights: Is There A Future After Germany v. Italy?, 11 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 125, 13844 (2013). 
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Draft Article 10).122 The 2001 Draft Articles were designed to expand and 
concretize state responsibility and accountability, not to shield individuals 
from the legal consequences of their acts. 
Lord Hoffmann seems to have been persuaded to equate state 
responsibility with individual conduct-based immunity in part because of a 
perceived risk of dual recovery in situations of shared responsibility: 
 
It has until now been generally assumed that the circumstances in which 
a state will be liable for the act of an official in international law mirror 
the circumstances in which the official will be immune in foreign 
domestic law. There is a logic in this assumption: if there is a remedy 
against the state before an international tribunal, there should not also be 
a remedy against the official himself in a domestic tribunal.123 
 
However, reasoning based on the possibility of dual recovery is plagued by 
both practical and conceptual challenges. Practically speaking, the risk of 
dual recovery is low because remedies are rarely available against the state 
itself. Additionally, proceedings against the state and proceedings against 
the official are not conceptually interchangeable because they involve 
different legal relationships. The former involves relationships with the 
state created by virtue of the act’s attributability to that state (for Category 
One and Category Two acts). Proceedings against the official, on the other 
hand, involve relationships with the individual wrongdoer that can have 
civil and/or criminal dimensions (for Category Two and Category Three 
acts).124 Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, who also participated in the 
House of Lords’s decision in Pinochet (No. 3), made a related point in his 
concurrence in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Jones: 
 
[T]he argument [that the state is indirectly impleaded by criminal 
proceedings, which was rejected in Pinochet] does not run in relation to 
civil proceedings either. If civil proceedings are brought against 
individuals for acts of torture in circumstances where the state is immune 
from suit ratione personae, there can be no suggestion that the state is 
vicariously liable. It is the personal responsibility of the individuals, not 
that of the state, which is in issue. The state is not indirectly impleaded 
by the proceedings.125 
 
 
 122.  Hernández, supra note 26, ¶ 82. 
 123.  Jones [2006] UKHL at [74] (Lord Hoffmann LJ). 
 124.  See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 125.  Jones v. Saudi Arabia [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1934 [128] (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers 
MR) (appeal taken from QB High Ct. of Justice). 
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For these reasons, relying on attributability as a guide to conduct-based 
immunity is misguided. If attribution does not discharge the individual 
from personal responsibility (that is, if the act falls into Category Two 
rather than into Category One), the individual is not automatically entitled 
to ratione materiae immunity solely on the basis of attribution. 
CONCLUSION 
Attribution cannot be the sole basis for determining whether or not a 
state official should be held personally responsible by a foreign court. An 
over-reliance on attribution as the sole criterion for determining whether or 
not an individual is entitled to ratione materiae immunity for a particular 
act is not supported by uniform historical precedents. It also runs counter to 
the rationale behind the ILC’s expansive approach to attribution in its 2001 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
Recognizing that Category Two acts do not invariably entail ratione 
materiae immunity will enable us to move beyond simple syllogisms and 
engage in a more robust debate about the trade-offs involved in designing 
transnational accountability regimes for individuals who violate 
international law.126 Debates about whether to attribute ultra vires acts to 
the state for purposes of state responsibility percolated for a century before 
the ILC adopted the 2001 Draft Articles. Draft Article 7 responds to the 
perceived “requirements of modern international life” with respect to state 
responsibility, but it says nothing about foreign official immunity. 
Drawing on the analytic framework proposed here, decision-makers 
can more clearly differentiate among acts that fall into Category One, 
Category Two, and Category Three. Only by unpacking these categories—
which are not monolithic—can we move towards a more conceptually and 
doctrinally coherent account of conduct-based immunity. 
 
 
 126.  I suggest some possible factors to consider in Keitner, supra note 9, at 85153, including 
whether a recognized foreign government has requested immunity on behalf of the official; whether the 
conduct was performed with actual rather than apparent authority; whether the defendant was served or 
arrested within the forum state’s territory; and whether the forum State’s legislature has attached legal 
consequences to the conduct, regardless of where it was performed. 
